Yet Another Example ...

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of the importance of framing.  We can conceive of economic activity as one of mutual exchange: we exchange and barter things with one another for the betterment of our respective selves.  In this sense, the exchange is voluntary and, absent overt coercion, free.  This strand of thought may have provided justification for a strand of decisions that emphasized formal voluntarism in entering into contracts, and all but ignores the circumstances of such entry that may entail choices between highly undesirable choices and even more dire options.
Another way of viewing the market and contract making is by focusing not on the act of voluntary bartering for the betterment of our mutual selves, but rather on the act of coercive bartering for survival, or enrichment, or whatnot.  This conception presupposes the premise that we hold what we own (be it goods or services) exclusively and we are coerced into bartering what we own to achieve those aims or we may exclude others from enjoyment in what we own because, for example, we occupy a superior bargaining position and may achieve those aims by obtaining from others services that those others might have to offer.  The idea of reciprocity becomes more apparent in this view of market relations, in the sense that if you own a resource that I need for my survival for example and cannot obtain elsewhere, and I cannot offer you any similar resource, then my bargaining position becomes materially worse than yours.  In this sense the aspect of coercion becomes more stark and prominent, such that a look at the circumstances that surrounds the bartering would be warranted to evaluate the "freedom" embodied by a particular barter or exchange.
There is no a priori justification for privileging one account of the market over another account.  Hence, this just shows the importance of framing the discussion in affecting policy choices.  Conceptions of labor is inextricably tied to two notions: what it means to be a person and how do people interact with one another.  You cannot untie the two but you can influence one and therefore shape the contours of the other.  For example, a more robust notion of personhood surely pushes back the idea that humans can enslave one another even when the enslavement is voluntary.  Therefore, a richer and more fulfilling choice for thinking about labor is perhaps to focus on the relationships among people in their interactions with one another.  What should be warranted and allowed in inducing another person to offer his or her services?  What cannot be violated?  What dictates and justifies the terms of this engagement?
In fact, this conception may move the conversation away from an emphasis on survival and need, and hence seeing people as fungible entities in the churn of market production, to a more equal and enriching conception of people are agents of multifarious capacities who strive to fulfill their potentials.  Rather than strictly adhering to what may be antiquated notions of acceptable aims that labor relations are to preserve and promote, perhaps we should focus on the process itself.  Indeed, we should explore on how our institutions and laws seek to contribute to the shaping of and the discussions about those aims, and in the very process shape and become shaped by those aims.